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By: Frederick M. MacDonald, Esq.'

The Utah judiciary is not known to often address cases affecting
substantive oil and gas law. However, during the period from September 2010 through to August 2011, significant rulings were issued in
three cases. No significant legislative or administrative oil and gas development occurred during that period.
1. Fred MacDonald is a shareholder of the energy law firm of Beatty & Wozniak,
P.C., and is based in its Utah office. He practiced twenty-two years with the Salt Lake
City natural resources law firm of Pruitt Gushee and, upon its dissolution, joined
Beatty & Wozniak in January, 2008. He received his B.S. in Engineering from Purdue
University in 1983 and his J.D. from the Valparaiso University School of Law in 1986.
His practice is concentrated in oil and gas law, including title examination of Federal,
fee, State of Utah, and Indian lands, coalbed methane development, unit formation
and operation, and administrative practice before the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining and U.S. Interior Board of Land Appeals.
Fred is a member of both the Utah and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Bar Associations, having served as chairman of the Utah State Bar's Natural Resource Section
from 1997-1998. He is an active member of both the Utah and American Associations
of Professional Landmen, currently serving as chair of the AAPL's Form 610 JOA
Revision task force and on its forms and public lands committees, and previously
serving on its coalbed methane committee. Additionally, Fred is actively involved
with the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, currently serving on the faculty
of the biennial Federal oil and gas leasing short course and previously serving as a
trustee-at-large. Fred is the author of Coalbed Methane Units: Making The Square Peg
Fit The Round Hole, Regulation and Development of Coalbed Methane, Paper No. 7
(Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 2002), The New AAPL Form 610 Coalbed Methane Checklist: Making The List And How To Check It Twice, 27 Energy & Min. L. Inst. Ch. 4
(2006), and Preparingand Finalizingthe Unit Agreement: Making Sure Your Exploratory Ducks Are In A Row, Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization,
Paper No. 8 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 2006), and lectures regularly on various oil and
gas issues. He has been listed in the Best Lawyers in America and Super Lawyers of
the Mountain States in the area of oil and gas law annually since 2007 and 2008, respectively, and was named Best Lawyers 2012 Salt Lake City Oil and Gas Lawyer of
the Year.
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EMINENT DOMAIN MAY NOT BE USED TO SECURE ACCESS
ACROSS OFF-LEASE LANDS To LEASEHOLD

In Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Partnership,the Utah Su-

preme Court, in a four-to-one decision, held that the term "mineral
deposits," as used in Utah's eminent domain statute,2 was ambiguous
and, under strict construction in favor of a landowner, is interpreted as
excluding oil and gas deposits.' As a consequence, a mineral lessee of
the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration
("TLA") could not utilize eminent domain to secure access to its
leasehold across adjacent off-lease private lands.'
Marion Energy, Inc. ("Marion") was the lessee under two leases
issued by TLA. The leases covered the oil, gas, and hydrocarbons underlying lands owned by the surface estate owner, KFJ Ranch Partnership ("KFJ"). KFJ also owned, in fee, both the surface and
mineral estates on the lands adjacent to those covered by Marion's
leases. Marion desired to drill two wells upon its leaseholds. However, due to topographic restraints, Marion deemed it impossible to
access the proposed drill sites without crossing the off-lease lands
owned in fee by KFJ. Marion attempted to negotiate with KFJ for an
approximate four mile access road easement, encompassing approximately fifteen acres, across KFJ's fee lands, but those negotiations
failed. Marion, together with TLA, then brought a condemnation action against KFJ for the easement.
Marion and TLA's suit against KFJ was predicated upon Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a), which permits the exercise of private
eminent domain for the construction of "roads, railroads, tramways,
tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the
milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the workings of mines,
quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution." 6 After commencement of the action, KFJ moved to dismiss on
the basis that the cited statute did not authorize the power of eminent
domain to take lands for roads to access oil and gas deposits. The
state district court, after briefing and hearing, granted KFJ's Motion
to Dismiss. It specifically found that the cited statute omitted the
terms "oil" and "gas" from the list of substances for which lands can
be condemned for roads.' Moreover, the Court found that the use of
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-501(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
3. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, No. 20090796, 2011 WL 3652398, at
*7 (Utah Aug. 19, 2011).
4. Id.
5. Id. at *1.
6. § 78B-6-501(6)(a).
7. Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 WL 3652398, at *3.
8. Id. at *4.
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those terms in other sections of the eminent domain statute' reflected
the Utah Legislature's intent to exclude oil and gas from the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(a).' 0 Marion and TLA then
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court contending the district court ignored over one hundred years of precedent demonstrating that the
phrase "mineral deposits" includes oil and gas and that any interpretation of that phrase to the contrary creates an absurd result."
The Supreme Court framed the central question for its review as
"whether Subsection 6(a)'s use of the phrase 'mineral deposits' encompasses the terms 'oil' and 'gas' and thereby provides Marion with
the authority to condemn KFJ's property to build a road to access its
leased oil and gas deposits."1 2 After reciting its recognized canons of
statutory construction, including the presumption that omissions in
statutory language are deemed purposeful and that any ambiguity in
any eminent domain statute must be strictly construed in favor of the
property owner and against the condemning party, the Court concluded Marion only could exercise eminent domain if subsection 6(a)
expressly granted or clearly implied by its plain language.1 3
Finding the term "mineral deposit" to be ambiguous, the Supreme
Court held that subsection 6(a) did not provide such an express grant
or clear implication. After review of numerous Utah cases and other
statutes, the Court concluded that "the term 'mineral deposits' does
not have a single ordinary accepted meaning." 14 Instead, the phrase's
meaning may vary and must be interpreted based upon the context in
which it is used." Because the context of subsection 6(a) does not
indicate the Legislature's intent to include oil and gas, the Court concluded the phrase is susceptible to two differing, reasonable interpretations and therefore is ambiguous. Consequently, with the statute
deemed ambiguous, pursuant to the construction canon requiring that
an ambiguity be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, the
Court ruled Marion and TLA lacked eminent domain authority to
take KFJ's land for the road. 6
The Supreme Court also concluded that its decision did not yield an
"absurd result." Initially, Marion and TLA had argued that to construe "mineral deposits" to exclude oil and gas would allow one landowner to effectively prevent TLA from accessing and exploiting its oil
and gas deposits for the benefit of its beneficiaries, a clearly important
9. See e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-501(6)(d) (authorizing private eminent domain for "gas, oil or coal" pipelines, tanks, and reservoirs and subsurface stratum for
underground storage of "natural gas").
10. Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 WL 3652398, at *2.
11. Id.
12. Id.

13. Id. at *3.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3-5, *7.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

3

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 18 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 22

664

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

and prioritized purpose as recognized by the Legislature in other statutory provisions. Additionally, Marion and TLA argued that such a
construction would give the parties the power of condemnation to
transport and store the resources" but curiously not the ability to produce them; the dissent found this argument persuasive.s However,
the Court rejected those arguments, stating Marion and TLA have
alternative rights of access, such as those on the leasehold expressly
granted under Utah Code Ann. § 53C-2-403.19 Of course, that reasoning fails to account for Marion's argument that topographical factors
rendered such on-lease access "impossible."
Interestingly, neither Marion nor TLA sought reconsideration of
the decision. Furthermore, the Author finds it intriguing that, although cited by Marion and TLA in their appellate brief, the Supreme
Court failed to address the special and unique rights of access to TLA
lands confirmed under the holding of Utah v. Andrus 20 (the "Cotter
decision"), or address the common law doctrine of easement by necessity if, as Marion asserted, the lands were totally landlocked and otherwise inaccessible.

II. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR MUST ISSUE FEDERAL OIL AND GAS
LEASES AT THE COMPLETION OF A SUCCESSFUL
COMPETITIVE BID PROCESS
In Impact Energy Resources, LLC v. Salazar, the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, held that the
United States Secretary of Interior is required under the provisions of

the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (the "MLA"), to issue Federal oil
and gas leases within sixty days following receipt of payment by the
highest bidder at a competitive lease sale. 2 ' However, because the
successful bidders in this case failed to initiate their lawsuit to force
such lease issuance within ninety days as required under other provisions of the MLA, their claims were time barred.
This case involves the infamous December 19, 2008 Federal oil and
gas auction held in Salt Lake City, the last auction held under the
Bush administration's jurisdiction which was disrupted by the bidding
antics of Timothy DeChristopher, an environmental protester. The
corporate plaintiffs were the successful bidders of nine parcels at that
sale, and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") accepted and
cashed their checks for the initial payments, bonus bids, and final year
rentals. 2 2 The nine parcels were among seventy-seven other parcels
17. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-501(6)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
18. Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 WL 3652398, at *5, *15.
19. Id. at *6.

20. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
21. Impact Energy Res., L.L.C. v. Salazar, Nos. 2:09-CV-435, 2:09-CV-440, 2010
WL 3489544, at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 1, 2010).
22. Id. at *1-3.
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subject to a lawsuit filed two days prior to the sale by the Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance ("SUWA") in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (the "D.C. Court").2 3 On January
17, 2009, the D.C. Court issued a restraining order enjoining BLM
from issuing the contested leases.24
On February 6, 2009, Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar, newly appointed by President Obama, issued an intra-agency memorandum directing the Utah BLM State Director to withdraw the seventy-seven
leases. On February 12, 2009, the Utah BLM State Director sent letters to the corporate plaintiffs advising them of the Secretary's directive, the withdrawal of their nine parcels from leasing, and authorizing
a refund of the payments made. The corporate plaintiffs immediately
appealed that decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals
("IBLA") in an effort to exhaust their administrative remedies. On
April 9, 2010, the IBLA issued a decision refusing to hear the appeal
on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction because the Secretary had already approved the actions taken by the Utah BLM.2 5 On May 13,
2009, the plaintiffs filed an action in the Federal District Court in
Utah, claiming the Secretary and the Utah BLM's decision to withdraw the leases after the sale exceeded their statutory authority or,
alternatively, that their actions were arbitrary and capricious.2 6
While acknowledging that under 30 U.S.C. § 225(c) the Secretary
has discretion to determine which Federal parcels may be leased, the
court concluded that his discretion is limited to pre-sale decisions
about whether or not to offer the lands for leasing.27 Conversely, the
court found that 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) mandates that once the
Secretary decides to lease a parcel, he "shall" accept the highest bid
from a responsible qualified bidder, and the lease "shall" be issued by
him within sixty days following receipt of payment by the bidder.
The court rejected the Secretary and BLM's argument to defer to
their determination that the leases could be withdrawn at any time,
stating the language of § 226(b)(1)(A) was clear, unambiguous, and
mandatory.2 9
Notwithstanding, the court then concluded that the ninety-day statute of limitations under 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 to challenge a decision of
the Secretary commenced with the issuance of the February 6, 2010
intra-agency memorandum, not with the mailing by the Utah BLM
Director of the letters to the plaintiffs on February 12, 2009.30 The
court found that because the Federal government was involved and
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *3-4.
See id. at *5 (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 226(b)(1)(A), 226(c) (2006)).
Id. at *4 (citing § 226(b)(1)(A)).
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8-9 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (2006)).
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this suit against it involved a waiver of sovereign immunity, any statute of limitations must be strictly construed in favor of the government." The court found that the February 6, 2009 intra-agency
memorandum constituted the Secretary's final decision and the February 12, 2009 letters to the plaintiffs as mere procedural acts enforcing
the Secretary's final decision; the letters did not serve to reopen the
Secretary's decision.3 2 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the statute of limitations tolled until they received the letters because
no equities requiring tolling existed. They had prior ample notice of
the Secretary's decision: a widely distributed press release, a notice
filed in the D.C. Court action, and individual letters. Furthermore,
in the IBLA appeal, the plaintiffs expressly asked the IBLA which of
the two actions (the intra-agency memorandum or the letters) constituted the Secretary's final action for appellate purposes. Although the
IBLA did not answer the question, the court deemed this sufficient
evidence that the plaintiffs were on notice that the limitations period
may have begun to run on February 7, and therefore they had sufficient time to comply. 34 Accordingly, the court ruled the plaintiffs had
filed their lawsuit one day too late and granted judgment in the defendants' favor. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the
court rejected by order entered January 20, 2011.1?
This case is currently on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. In addition, it
should be noted that the Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming, in Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar, rejected the Utah
court's holding that the Secretary was mandated to issue the leases
within sixty days of receipt of payment, instead ruling the Secretary
must issue a decision on whether or not the lands are to be leased
within sixty days of receipt of payment.3 Obviously, this frames the
contradicting holdings to be resolved by the Tenth Circuit.
III.

DECHRISTOPHER SENTENCED TO

Two

YEARS AND

$10,000 FINE
Relating to the Impact case discussed immediately above, on July
26, 2011, Judge Dee Benson of the United States District Court for
the District of Utah sentenced Timothy DeChristopher to two years in
prison and a fine of $10,000 for his actions at the December 19, 2008
lease auction. At the auction, DeChristopher registered as a bidder
31. Id. at *8.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *9.
34. Id.
35. Order Den. Mot. for Relief, Impact Energy Res., 2010 WL 3489544 (No. 2:09CV-435).
36. W. Energy Alliance v. Salazar, No. 10-CV-0226, 2011 WL 3737520, at *3 (D.
Wyo. June 29, 2011).
37. Judgment, U.S. v. DeChristopher, 2011 WL 3269197 (D. Utah July 28, 2011)
(No. 2:09-CR-000183-001).
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and filled out the Bidder Registration Form (the "Form"), which required certification that: (1) he was a good-faith bidder; (2) he had
the intention to acquire a lease on the offered lands; (3) a winning bid
constituted a legally binding commitment to accept the lease; and (4)
if he was the successful bidder, he would tender a specified percentage
of the winning bid, whether or not the lease subsequently issued."
The Form also expressly advised DeChristopher of the criminal consequences of tampering with the bidding process.39
DeChristopher then bid on numerous parcels, many of which he bid
up, then pulled out. He was the high bidder on fourteen parcels, covering over 22,000 acres and totaling $1.7 million. He later admitted he
never had an intention of paying for the leases and ultimately failed to
tender the requisite amounts at day's end. He claimed that his tampering with the bidding process was necessary to stop unlawful governmental action and prevent exacerbation of global warming and
climate change. 4 0 He was subsequently charged with two felony
counts, violation of the Federal Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act and
making false statements. 4 1 Ruling on a pre-trial Motion in Limine, the
court held DeChristopher could not present to the jury his "choice of
evils" defense.4 2
On March 3, 2011, after a jury trial, DeChristopher was convicted
on both counts by a jury. He faced a maximum sentence of up to ten
years in prison and up to $750,000 in fines. In imposing a lesser sentence, Judge Benson cited DeChristopher's continued recalcitrance
and defiance and public statements that civil disobedience is justified
in fighting climate change-specifically citing DeChristopher's posttrial statements in which he encouraged others to similarly "buck the
system."4 3 If not for that "continuing trail of statements," the Judge
indicated DeChristopher might not have faced prosecution, let alone
prison." "The offense itself, with all apologies to people actually in
the auction itself, wasn't that bad." 45 The Judge suggested that
DeChristopher had other legal avenues to challenge issuance of the
leases, as reflected by the D.C. Court case brought by SUWA which
ultimately stopped the leases he was concerned with from being issued. "I'm not saying there isn't a place for civil disobedience, but it
can't be the order of the day." 46 Judge Benson also refused to require
38. U.S. v. DeChristopher, No. 2:09-CR-183, 2009 WL 3837208, at *2 (D. Utah

Nov. 16, 2009).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Brandon Loomis, DeChristopherSentenced to Prison,26 Protestors Arrested,
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (July 28, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/52263987-78/
dechristopher-federal-prison-leases.html.csp.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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DeChristopher to pay restitution for the asserted losses sustained by
the BLM and the energy companies who had bid against him.
DeChristopher's attorneys have filed an appeal of his conviction to
the Tenth Circuit.
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